This paper explores an empirical methodology to assess the impacts of trade reforms on household behavior in developing countries. I focus on consumption and income responses: when price reforms take place, households modify consumption and production decisions and local labor markets adjust. The paper proposes a joint estimator of demand and wage price elasticities from survey data. The method uses an empirical model of demand to extract price information from unit values, and uses this information to estimate the response of households to price reforms. By correcting unit values for quality effects and measurement error, the method overcomes the problem of the endogeneity of unit values. By endogeneizing household income, the model corrects potential biases in the estimation of own-and cross-price elasticities in consumption. I apply the method to an expenditure and income survey for rural Mexico. It is shown that the corrections suggested in this paper are empirically important. In particular, I show that allowing for consumption and income responses is a key element of an accurate empirical assessment of trade policy.
Introduction
Trade in agricultural products is perhaps one of the most promising instruments for poverty alleviation in developing countries. This is because agriculture is a key productive activity in poor countries and because world markets can provide new opportunities for rural producers.
However, international markets for agricultural products have long been distorted by the policies of developed countries. Policies of domestic support, such as subsidies to production or exports, and policies of market access, such as tariffs and non-tariff barriers, are examples.
Understanding and measuring the impacts of WTO reforms on poor households in developing countries is therefore critical to the current trade and poverty debate.
When price reforms are implemented, particularly in agriculture, households are affected both as consumers and as income earners. The standard proposition of the literature is that, after an increase in the price of a good, net consumers will be worse off but net producers will be better off (Deaton, 1989) . In this static context, the welfare effects of a price change can be assessed by comparing budget shares and income shares. This argument, however, fails to consider dynamic household responses. Consumers may respond by substituting away from the more expensive goods. In rural areas, farmers may increase agricultural production, farm employment and wages, and purchases of inputs and services in local markets. Importantly, thus, the net position of the household becomes endogenous: sufficiently large consumption and income responses may cause an ex-ante net consumer to become an ex-post net producer, thus benefiting from the price increase.
The measurement of the total household welfare effect, one that jointly considers first order effects in consumption and production as well as consumption and income responses, is the objective of this paper. I propose a joint estimator of demand price-elasticities and agricultural wage price-elasticities from survey data. The empirical method relies on a two-step strategy, first estimating the responses of household behavior to prices and, second, linking prices to the reforms. The method requires the estimation of structural models:
household responses are linked to prices through structural parameters that are in turn used to simulate policy outcomes. 1 The estimation of these structural parameters requires survey data with sufficient price variation at the household level. This is rarely the case. One possibility is to combine household surveys with official price information. Some studies exploit time and regional variation in official prices (Deaton, 1997; Porto, 2003; Ravallion, 1990; Wolak, 1996) ; others use community price questionnaires (Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2004a; 2004b) . In this paper, I
use unit values, the ratio of reported expenditures and quantities, as measures of prices.
The main advantage of using unit values in household models is the substantial cross-sectional variability. However, unit values are not the same as prices when consumers jointly choose quantity and quality (Deaton, 1987) . Since unit values combine measures of price and quality, unit values can only be used as proxies for prices. This may lead to biases in the estimation of the relevant structural parameters. Further, endogenous income responses generate additional income effects that can bias the estimates of Marshallian demand elasticities.
2 Building on the seminal work of Deaton (1987 Deaton ( , 1988 Deaton ( , 1990 , I develop methods to correct the estimates of consumption and income responses.
The procedure works as follows. By modeling consumer choices of quantity and quality simultaneously, I am able to extract the right price signals from unit values, expenditures, and quality choices. Then, I use this price information to estimate the response of consumption and wage agricultural income. To do this, I develop a general equilibrium econometric model of agricultural prices, quantities consumed, unit values, and household income.
I estimate the own-and cross-price elasticities as well as the wage-price elasticities using survey data for rural Mexico. It is shown that using unit values instead of prices may indeed lead to inconsistent results, and that the corrections suggested in this paper are empirically important. On the income side, the endogeneity of unit values and measurement error lead to attenuation bias in the estimates of the wage elasticities. On the demand side, the correction for the endogeneity of household agricultural income seems to make a difference in terms of both the Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities. These differences originate in the consistent estimation of the expenditure elasticities and in the account of the "profit effect". I also reforms, which are often accompanied by other simultaneous reforms, are an example. In many instances, in addition, there is an interest, or a need, to explore the effects of a policy that has not yet taken place. WTO reforms are an example. The method proposed here accommodates these cases. 2 This is a version of the "profit effect" discussed in Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) .
show that the evaluation of the impacts of an increase in the price of major agricultural products (like corn) is sensitive to the inclusion of both consumption and income effects, as well as to the allowance for consumption and income responses.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a general motivation and develops the econometric model. I provide an overview of the methodology and I introduce the general equilibrium econometric model of consumption and income responses. In section 3, I apply the methods to the Mexican data and I report the results on the demand and wage income price-elasticities. Section 4 simulates the welfare effects of the increase in the price of corn taking into account consumption and income responses of Mexican households. In Section 5, I conclude.
The Econometric Model
In most studies of price reforms, such as those summarized in Deaton (1997) , the analysis is based on the responses of household consumption. Standard arguments of efficiency, based on price elasticities, and equity, based on expenditure elasticities, are used to characterize optimal taxes or to indicate direction of changes in the structure of taxation. This analysis omits important aspects of the effects of any policy, namely the responses of outputs, wages, and household income. To estimate the impacts of the reforms both on the expenditure and income sides, I argue that it is necessary to estimate own-and cross-price elasticities, on the one hand, and wage-price elasticities, on the other.
Discussions about the poverty impacts of trade reforms often make the argument that supply responses are critical for the poor. Specifically, WTO reforms on agricultural trade are expected to boost production opportunities in rural areas in developing countries.
Proponents of this view argue that agricultural trade liberalization will bring about increases in international prices of agricultural goods. Faced with higher permanent prices, households will choose to devote more resources to agricultural production and firms will increase their labor demand in agriculture. This higher demand may involve higher employment in rural farms (for planting, weeding, or harvesting), or it may imply higher labor demand in agricultural services (such as sales of fertilizers and tools and farm maintenance).
How can these effects be estimated? With a household survey database containing information on expenditures and quantities of agricultural goods, a naive model to estimate the responses of wages to changes in agricultural prices would be to run a regression of wages on unit values. Let a hc be the agricultural wage income of household h living in region (cluster) c. Let ln v g c be the log unit values of good g reported by households in cluster c. A simple model would be
where m hc is a vector of controls such as gender, age and marital status of the household head, his/her education, household size and demographic composition, and time and regional dummies.
There are three concerns with a regression model such as (1): endogeneity of unit values, bias due to proxy variables, and measurement error. Endogeneity may arise because households simultaneously choose quantity and quality. Therefore, unit values are not a perfect measure of prices. Even when unit values are a good proxy for prices, the model may estimate the vector γ consistently, but λ inconsistently (i.e., the proxy bias). Measurement error arises if there are inaccurate responses, mainly on quantities consumed. In all these cases, OLS estimation of (1) will lead to inconsistent estimates of the wage agricultural income price-elasticities. The joint estimator developed in this section takes care of all these problems.
In a general equilibrium model with wage and supply responses, there may be additional problems in the estimation of own-and cross-price elasticities using standard empirical models of demand (such as those discussed in Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a) . Concretely, when a fraction of household income responds to price changes, the elasticities will be inconsistently estimated. To see this, let household preferences over agricultural and non-agricultural goods be defined by a utility function u h = u h (c h ), where c h is a vector of consumption. Utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint pc h = x h . The vector of demand functions is c
In a typical model of demand, total expenditure x h is considered exogenous (both economically and statistically). In household production models, instead, at least a part of expenditure can be statistically endogenous (but still exogenous for the household as a decision maker). In my model, for example, wage agricultural income depends on the prices of the agricultural goods through changes in demand for labor in agricultural activities. In consequence, a decline, say, in prices has two sources of income effects: the usual income effect, whereby real income increases at constant relative prices, and the change in nominal income caused by the responses of agricultural wage income.
In the development literature, this effect has been labeled "profit effect" in the work of Barnum and Squire (1979) and Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) . In these household production models, a change in prices brings about a change in household profits in agriculture and a change in income. Singh, Squire and Strauss argued that, both in theory and in practice, the profit effect could significantly alter the magnitude, and even the sign, of the uncompensated quantity responses. To see this formally, differentiate the demand of good c 1 , say, with respect to the price p 1 to get
Further, decompose the price effect captured by the first term on the right hand side in the usual compensated demand change, ∂e c h1 /∂p 1 , and the standard income effect −c h1 ∂c h1 /∂x h from the Slutsky equation. This leads to
Figure 1 provides an intuition. The initial price vector is p 0 ; at these prices, the consumer chooses the bundle c 0 of goods. Let's assume that the price of good 1 (with quantities measured on the horizontal axis) declines and that wage agricultural income a h is negatively associated with this price. This means that when p 1 declines, the budget line first rotates (with nominal income held constant) and then shifts, when a h increases. The final Note: At price p 0 , the consumer chooses bundle c 0 . When the price of good 1 declines, the budget line rotates and shifts outward (if agricultural wages are negatively associated with p 1 ). The final equilibrium is at c 1 at prices p 1 . The "profit effect" generates an additional income effect that accounts for the difference between c x 1 and c 1 1 .
equilibrium at the price vector p 1 is at c 1 . The substitution effect is the movement from c In the case depicted in Figure 1 , the consumption of good 1 increases with lower prices. But it is easy to build cases in which consumption actually declines when prices are lower, even for a normal good. The joint estimator developed next incorporates these additional income effects.
A simplified Model
The method proposed in this paper combines a model such as (1), with true unobservable prices instead of unit values as regressors, with the model of demand and quality shading developed by Deaton (1987 Deaton ( , 1988 Deaton ( , 1990 . In order to introduce the method, I begin by setting up a simplified version of the model with only one good.
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The demand for the good is modeled with an equation characterizing budget shares. For the moment, I ignore other goods that may complete the system. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) show that a suitable model (that is, a utility consistent model) for the budget share
where x hc is total expenditure, z hc are household demographic characteristics, such as number of members and demographic composition. π c is a price level that is assumed to be the same for all households in cluster c; this price is unobservable. f c is a cluster fixed effect and u 0 hc is a standard error term, with zero mean (for a large number of households in each cluster) and variance σ 00 .
The endogeneity of unit values can be solved by modeling unit values explicitly. Unit values are not the same as prices because they are part price and part quality. In fact, changes in prices and in total expenditure will cause consumers to respond partly by modifying quantities and partly by modifying quality. I assume that
Here, unit values v hc are affected by prices and by household expenditure x hc . The parameter ψ captures the shading of quality to price changes, and the parameter β 1 is called the "quality elasticity" or the "expenditure elasticity of quality"; β 1 would be zero if there were no quality shading, in which case ψ=1. Demographics z hc determine unit values, too. The error term u 1 hc has mean zero (for a large number of h in cluster c) and variance σ 11 .
Equations (2) and (3) will be used to extract true price signals from unit values. This price information is then used to estimate the endogenous determination of household wage 3 I describe this artificial model just to provide an intuition for the more difficult formulas of the full model of section 3. No attempt to generality or general equilibrium is pursued here. agricultural income, a hc . I redefine (1) as
where m hc are household characteristics that affect wage agricultural income. Some elements of m hc , such as education, are different from the determinants of the budget shares and unit values. u 2 hc is a standard error term. The coefficient λ measures the price elasticity, or the proportional change in agricultural income brought about by the changes in product prices.
In (4), all households in a given cluster are assumed to face the same price π c .
While consumer prices are relevant in equations (2) and (3), producer prices are more important in determining wages. For a tradable good with exogenous international prices and no domestic distortions, producer and consumer prices would be the same. This interpretation, however, does not allow prices to vary by cluster. In practice, prices vary regionally because of local taxes, transport costs, and transaction costs. Since information on unit values in production is not available, I need to rely on consumer prices and unit values on consumption as a source of variation for producer prices. This is a common problem in the literature (see Edmonds and Pavcnik, 2004a) .
If prices π c were observed, it would be straightforward to estimate a model characterized by (2) and (4). 4 This is a system of equations that can be handled easily with well-known econometric techniques. But prices π c are not observed. In this model, the identification assumption is that every household in cluster c faces the same prices. This suggests a two-stage strategy. In the first stage, unobserved prices are controlled for with cluster dummies (which will absorb any fixed effects as well). In the second stage, the elasticities are estimated by using the information on prices contained in the residuals from the first stage. Details follow.
In the first stage, I recover β 0 , γ 0 , β 1 , γ 1 and γ 2 by consistently estimating the model, after demeaning all variables (s hc , ln v hc , ln a hc , ln x hc , z hc , and m hc ) from cluster means. Consistency may be achieved with OLS, if expenditures are considered statistically exogenous, or with IV. I elaborate more on this when I discuss the full model below. With
construct three variables by subtracting the explained part of the model from the dependent variables in (2), (3) and (4). I get
Averaging (5), (6) and (7) at the cluster level, it follows that 
where n c is the (common) number of observations (households) in a cluster c, b σ 01 is the estimated covariance between the residuals in the budget share equations and unit value equations, and b σ 11 is the estimated variance of the residuals of the unit value equation. 
where p is the price elasticity of quantity with respect to price π and x is the total expenditure elasticity of the group. To interpret (11), notice that it is possible to define quality so that unit values can be written as the product of price and quality (see Appendix 1 for details). Hence, the response of unit value to price is one plus the effect of shading quality due to higher prices. This depends on the quality elasticity, β 1 , the price elasticity p , and the income elasticity, x . When price increases, p captures the reduction in demand and β 1 / x captures the quality effect. If β 1 = 0 or p = 0, then there is no quality shading and ψ = 1. When there is quality shading to prices, ψ < 1.
To close the model, I need to relate the quantities p and x to the estimable parameters.
I do this in Appendix 1, where I derive the empirical restriction that identifies the model. This is given by
where b a is the average share of wage agricultural income in total expenditure, and s is the average budget share. The empirical version of (12) can be combined with the estimates of b φ 1 and b φ 2 to solve for b θ, b ψ and b λ. A generalization to the case of many goods follows.
The Full Model
In this section, I derive the formulas needed to implement the full model, with many agricultural goods, cross-price elasticities, and several agricultural wage income price-elasticities. To extend the simplified model, I begin by rewriting the general formulas for budget shares, unit values and agricultural wage income. With G goods, the budget share spent on good g by household h (in cluster c) is
where ln π k c is the (log) price of good k in cluster c. As before, f g c is a fixed effect at the cluster level and u g0 hc is the error term, with mean zero and variance σ g 00 . This is the AIDS model of demand developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) .
The unit value equation for good g is
Here, the "quality elasticity" for good g is β g 1 . The error term u g1 hc has zero mean and variance σ g 11 . This is just the generalization of equation (3).
There are G equations (13) and (14); instead, there is only one agricultural wage income
where u 2 hc is an error term. As argued above, changes in prices, particularly of agricultural goods, will cause some agricultural activities to expand and some others to contract. This, in turn, will lead to changes in agricultural labor demand and supply and, in the end, to changes in the agricultural wage income of rural households. Equation (15) captures these effects. 6 As in the simplified model, estimation proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, I demean budget shares, log unit values and log agricultural income to eliminate prices and cluster fixed effects. In principle, there is no problem with the consistent estimation of these parameters if the regressors are exogenous, as in Deaton (1990) In particular, since the set of explanatory variables in m hc is different from the set of explanatory variables in z hc , I use the variables that are in m but not in z as instruments.
These exclusion restrictions allow me to fully identify the parameters of the first stage. The parameters of the agricultural wage income equation are identified provided m is exogenous.
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In the second stage, I subtract the explained part of the model from each of the dependent variables, and I compute their averages by clusters. It follows that
where u 0 cg , u 1 cg , and u 2 c are average error terms in cluster c. Whereas in the simplified model I was interested in three parameters, ψ, θ and λ, here I need to estimate two matrices and one vector of parameters. The matrices are Ψ and Θ, with gth row denoted by ψ g = (ψ g1 , ..., ψ gg , ..., ψ gG ) and θ g = (θ g1 , ..., θ gg , ..., θ gG ), respectively.
The vector of wage elasticities is λ = (λ 1 , ..., λ G ) 0 .
To solve for the matrices of parameters, Θ, Ψ, and λ, I need to manipulate the model and introduce some new notation. Let p c be a G × 1 vector of the logarithm of (unobserved) prices in cluster c. Stacking the vectors p 0 c for all clusters, I get a C × G matrix P of prices. Next, I stack observations on average unit values for good g, (17), into a C × 1 vector
, where 1 C is a C × 1 vector of ones, ψ g is the gth row of matrix Ψ and u 1 g is a vector of residuals. It follows that
where Π is the variance-covariance matrix of the vector of good prices (across clusters).
Next, I construct a G × G matrix V 1 with element gk given by (19) (20)
where Ω 11 is the matrix with gk element E[u 
Next, I build a G × G matrix V 10 with element gk given by (21)
where Ω 10 is the matrix with gk element E[u
So far, I have shown how estimation of the model of demand delivers algebraic expressions involving the unknown matrices Θ and Ψ; these are equations (20) and (22). These equations can be combined to express one of these matrices as a function of the other. For instance,
This expression has an interpretation in terms of OLS regression coefficients -corrected for measurement errors-among the average cluster residuals of the unit value and budget share equations for the different goods.
The next step is to develop similar formulas involving the vector λ of wage agricultural income price elasticities. One option is to combine the agricultural income equation with the unit value equations. Writing the agricultural income equation for cluster c as a stacked
This allows me to build a G × 1 vector v 21 with element g given by (24)
where ω 21 is a vector with
This relationship can also be interpreted as OLS slopes (corrected for measurement error).
To complete the model and solve for the parameters of interest (i.e., the price elasticities), I need to extend the quality model to many goods. In Appendix 1, I show that the generalization of equation (12) is given by
, where δ gk is the Kronecker delta. Defining a vector ξ with element β
for good g, and a vector s of average budget shares, I can write
where D(ξ) and D(s) are matrices with the elements of vectors ξ and s on the diagonal (and zero off-diagonal elements), and 1 G is a G × 1 vector of ones. The symbol ⊗ is the Kronecker product.
These are all the steps needed to close the model. The mechanics of the solution involves using (23), (26) and (28) to solve for the matrices Θ and Ψ, and the vector λ. Replacing (23) in (28), I get
This matrix is a function of the data. Plugging this into (23) and (26), I solve for b
The matrix of uncompensated demand elasticities can be estimated with
and the matrix of compensated, Hicksian demand elasticities, with
where a typical element of the vector ζ is β These varieties are considered homogeneous goods. Consumers choose different varieties of good, but report expenditures and purchases of consumption aggregates (see Appendix 1). In rural areas, food consumption includes market purchases and own-consumption. Following Deaton and Grimard (1992) , for instance, we compute unit values using market purchases only, but budget shares using all expenditure (purchases plus home production).
Fruits & Vegetables, Corn and Meat are the major categories of food expenses in the sample. Notice that average unit values for all these food products increase in real terms from 1994 to 2000. 8 As a result, budget shares decline with time. Notice that the number of households that report quantities (and, thus, unit values) is lower than the number of households in the sample. This is not surprising.
On the income side, information includes wage earnings, capital income, and other sources of income. In the estimation that follows, a h is defined as wage income in agricultural activities (farm employment) and self employment income earned in agriculture. This includes, first, income from agricultural production (sell of corn, wheat, etc.). Unfortunately, the data do not identify the value of sales of different crops, but just the total income from all agricultural activities. Second, the definition of a h includes wages related to agricultural activities, like off-farm employment and rural labor in the field. We do not know, however, whether these wages are earned in corn, wheat, or dairy production. Overall, agricultural wages as defined above account for around 60 percent of the total income of rural families.
Notice that real wages decline by about 20 percent from 1994 to 2000.
Household characteristics include the size of the family, the demographic composition, and age, gender, marital status, and educational level. These are the controls that I include in the estimation of the first stage. The educational variables (primary school, secondary school, college) are assumed to affect the wage income but not the consumption decisions.
In other words, the educational variables are in the vector m hc but not in the demographic vector z hc . In the first stage, I include year dummies to control for the different years in which the surveys were collected.
Since I am studying the agricultural sector in Mexico, I need to discuss PROCAMPO, a key agricultural policy in the country. PROCAMPO is a program that provides income support to rural farmers. It was implemented in 1994 to replace the policy of support to producer prices that was being eliminated at that time. For my purposes, there are two features of PROCAMPO that I want to highlight. First, the elimination of pan-seasonal and pan-territorial prices in agricultural commodities implies a movement towards market prices. This means that the variation in purged unit values that I use to identify the model truly originates in price differences across clusters. Second, PROCAMPO subsidies are decoupled and thus are not set on the basis on current household behavior or outcomes (like production levels). In other words, lump-sum subsidies are unlikely to affect household behavior. Further, provided PROCAMPO money is spent in the same way as other sources on income, the role of these subsidies in demand will be correctly controlled for by including total household expenditure as a regressor (Case and Deaton, 1998) . There are thus good grounds to believe that the presence of PROCAMPO will not affect the estimates and the procedure developed in this paper. 
Household Wage Income
I begin with a discussion of the economics behind the impacts that I am estimating. Suppose that WTO negotiations succeed and that developed countries eliminate production and export subsidies as well as trade barriers on agriculture. As international prices increase, outcomes and behavior in rural households are affected. In general equilibrium, changes in product prices (corn, for instance) may bring about changes in factor prices (like wages) and in household income. I want to rationalize these ideas with a theoretical model.
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In rural areas, household members may work in local farms in exchange for a wage, may work on their own farms, or may work in agricultural activities (provision of services, sales of inputs). Income derived from all these activities is denoted by a h and is called agricultural wage income. Wages or other incomes earned in non-agricultural activities are denoted with i h . For simplicity, I assume that this income i h is exogenous. 11 Thus, total household income x h is given by
9 Notice, however, that there are instances in which PROCAMPO could affect my results. If, for instance, receiving subsidies encourages some individuals not to participate in labor markets, there might be an unmeasured effect on wages. Since I am not modeling labor supply in this paper, such effects are left for future research. 10 Notice that in the econometric model, demand, quality, and agricultural wage income were jointly analyzed. However, since consumption choices can be easily modeled with well-known models of utility maximization, and quality choices can be handled with restrictions on preferences (see Appendix 1), I focus on the behavior of agricultural factor markets.
11 In order to derive income effects on the demand side, it is necessary to have some exogenous income and I assume that i h plays this role (instead of adding an additional term, x 0 h , in the equation). Although this assumption is not really necessary, it makes the empirical estimation more tractable. The production function of activity j in sector 1 is f
I discuss how
, where l 1 j is employment of specific factor 1, and l m j is employment of mobile labor. There may be other factors used in the production of j (such as land or capital), but I omit this discussion for simplicity.
Producers of agricultural activities j in sector 1 (corn, for instance) face exogenous prices p 1 j , which depend on international prices and domestic conditions such as transport or transaction costs. Profit maximization leads to labor demand functions
where w 1 is the agricultural wage in sector 1, w m is the agricultural wage of mobile labor, and p is a vector of agricultural price products.
Labor market clearing conditions are
With endogenous factor supplies, There is one important clarification that I should make. The goal of this section is to estimate functions relating agricultural wages, a h , with agricultural prices. In the data, households report agricultural wages without identifying the agricultural activities on which wages are earned (type 1, type 2 or mobile). This means that I will only be able to estimate the average response of agricultural income in the different agricultural activities. This will be a weighted average of the responses of w 1 , w 2 and w m .
To see this, suppose that it is possible to estimate wages as a function of prices. Denote the response of the log of w 1 to the log of price g as β Note: The length of the horizontal box is the supply of mobile labor L m ; its wage is w m . The curves l 1 1 and l 1 2 represent the labor demand in activities of type 1 (which use specific labor L 1 ). The total demand of this specific labor is l 1 . The total labor demand in activities of type 2 is l 2 . drawn, there are two such activities, say corn and fruits & vegetables. The curve l 2 represents the demand for mobile labor in agricultural activities of type 2. For simplicity, there is only one activity in sector 2, namely dairy.
In the Figure, I have purposely assumed a much larger demand for labor in activities 1 than in activities 2. Accordingly, an increase in prices p 1 1 or p 1 2 (the prices of corn and fruits & vegetables) would shift l 1 up, causing w m to increase. In addition, while w 1 would increase as well, w 2 would decline. In contrast, an increase in p 2 1 (the price of dairy) would cause w m and w 2 to increase, but w 1 to decline. In consequence, the situation plotted in Figure 2 suggests that increases in the prices of corn or fruits & vegetables would most likely cause average wage income to increase, but increases in the price of dairy would most likely cause wage income to decline. It is clear that, theoretically, anything can happen and that wage income can increase or decrease. This is, in the end, an empirical question which I address next.
Results are reported in Apart from the price of meat, which appears to affect wage agricultural income positively too, the remaining prices are statistically insignificant. These results suggest that the problems associated with the use of unit values as regressors in the wage equation may indeed be present. Attenuation bias due to measurement error, for instance, may be critical: all unit value regressors, except for corn and meat, are not statistically significant.
The remaining columns of Table 2 There is an intuitive interpretation of these results. Corn and Fruits & Vegetables are arguably agricultural activities of type 1, which employ a large fraction µ 1 of the workforce.
When the prices of these goods increase, the demand for mobile labor and specific labor of type 1 increase. This leads to increases in the wages of mobile labor and on the return to specific agrarian labor. When the price of dairy increases, instead, there is also an increase in the demand for mobile labor. However, this increase in w m causes a decline in the surplus accruing to specific labor of type 1. If agrarian activities ag 1 j are important enough, average agricultural income may decline in the end.
In column [3] , I report the OLS estimates (assuming exogeneity of expenditure in the first stage estimation of the share and unit value equations). It is found that higher corn prices are associated with higher agricultural wage income, whereas higher prices of dairy products negatively affect agricultural income. No statistically significant effect is found in the rest of the cases, including fruits & vegetables.
Based on the estimates in Table 2 , the price of corn seems to be systematically related with agricultural wage income, the relationship being positive and significant in all models.
The use of average unit values as regressors in the naive model may be incorrect, however.
First, dairy and fruits & vegetables have statistically significant impacts on household wage agricultural income in the Full Model. In addition, the price of meat, which is positively related with a h in the naive model, it is no longer significant in the Full model. Since the Full method is robust to the inconsistencies that arise when using unit values as proxies for prices, the corrections of my method seem important. In one case, namely corn, the models deliver comparable elasticities; but in three out of the remaining five cases, results are significantly different.
The formulas for the joint estimator proposed in this paper are quite complex.
Specifically, the full model requires the estimation of a complete system of demand and agricultural wage income, which implies a lot of work to prepare and compute the matrices of section 2. If the estimator is going to be used in the evaluation of policies, it seems important to inquire if slightly modified versions of the model can help simplify the formulas.
In addition, since the model can only estimate linear regression functions for household outcomes, it may not be used in cases where the outcome involves discrete choices (such as labor supply decisions). Finally, since the model estimates a large number of parameters, there might be efficiency concerns.
A promising alternative is to assume that unit values are only affected by own prices, so that the cross-price effects in equation (14) are zero. This is, in fact, not a strong assumption, since the full model delivers, in the end, estimates of the off-diagonal elements of Ψ that are very close to zero. 13 The diagonal elements of Ψ are instead estimated. Estimation can be carried out as in section 2, but replacing b Ψ with e Ψ, a diagonal matrix with the elements b ψ gg in the diagonal, and zero off-diagonal elements. Results are in columns [4] and [5] of Table 2 .
As expected, this version of the model improves the OLS estimation of the naive model and delivers estimates that are close to those in the Full model. This is because the estimates b ψ gk are not significantly different from zero. Alternative 1 seems to be a good compromise between the Full model, which may be quite complicated to estimate and not be flexible enough in some applications (see Balat and Porto, 2004) .
Own-and Cross-price Elasticities
There are two reasons why the elasticities estimated from the full model can differ from the elasticities in Deaton (1990) model. One issue is that the estimated expenditure elasticities and quality elasticities may be inconsistent if a fraction of household expenditure (the fraction that depends on agricultural wage income) depends on agricultural prices. The second issue is the presence of the "profit effect" the additional income effect generated by the endogenous response of household income. In this section, I assess empirically how important these problems are by comparing the results obtained from the full model with those obtained from Deaton's model.
In Table 3 , I report estimates of the expenditure elasticity (or income elasticity) of It is instructive to decompose the differences in the own-price elasticities between the different models. This decomposition can shed some light on the relative importance of the two factors that explain these differences. One is the correction that allows for the consistent estimation of expenditure elasticities (in demand and in unit values -or quality); the other factor is the "profit effect". The decomposition is shown in Table 5 for the case of the uncompensated demand elasticities. , instead. In the case of corn, the two corrections of this paper decrease the estimated elasticity. The correction for the endogeneity of x h is less important than the "profit effect." In the case of dairy, the corrections of the paper drive the elasticity up, from −1.28 to −1.39, due to endogeneity, and further up to −2.29, due to the profit effect. It follows that most of the differences in the estimated elasticities is explained by this last effect -intuitively, an increase in the price of dairy (which reduces consumption) reduces agricultural wage income (with an elasticity of −1.1 in Table 2 ) and causes a negative income effect that pulls consumption of dairy further down. An interesting case is fruits & vegetables, where the correction for endogeneity is not really important but the addition of the profit effect renders the demand elasticity statistically insignificant. This is because the increase in the price of fruits & vegetables has a strong wage effect, and thus a strong positive income effect.
To better understand the role played by the "profit effect", notice that the additional income effects caused by the response of household income to prices have two effects on consumer choices. First, by facing changed incomes, households modify consumption choices according to the expenditure elasticity. Second, consumers modify their quality choices according to the quality elasticity of expenditure. This means, first, that there is an additional term in the income effects in demand, and, second, that there is an income effect on quality choices (the third term on the right hand side of (28)).
I separate these two effects in the last two columns of Table 5 For completeness, I report the full set of own-and cross-price compensated and uncompensated demand elasticities for the full model in Table 6 . The cross-price elasticities are generally small, and not always statistically significant. This result is in line with those reported in many previous studies and summarized in Deaton (1997) .
Net Consumers and Net Producers
In this section, I use the estimated elasticities to assess the role of consumption and income responses in the evaluation of the welfare effects of a price change. Since the pioneering work of Deaton (1989) in Thailand, it is customary to state that, after a price increase, net consumers will be hurt while net producers will be benefited. The opposite happens after a drop in prices. I argue here that, while this prediction is true in a static scenario, it may be misleading in a more dynamic setting where households can adjust consumption and income. In this case, the net position of the household is endogenously determined. Indeed, if household responses are large enough, it is possible for some net consumers to become net producers and be actually benefited by the price increase.
I illustrate these scenarios by exploring the corn sector, a key commodity produced in rural Mexico. For the sake of exposition only, I work with an increase in the price of corn.
14 Following the usual practice is this literature (Deaton, 1989; 1997) , I define the welfare effects of the price change as the compensating variation expressed as a share of total household expenditure. In Figure 3 , the average welfare effects are plotted against the log of household per capita expenditure. The averages are estimated non-parametrically with locally (kernel) weighted regressions. The static impact of the price increase is given by the difference between the share of income from corn production and the share of corn expenditure in total consumption. I plot this difference with a solid line. As expected, households at the bottom of the income distribution are net consumers and households at the top are net producers of corn. In consequence, a price increase hurts the poor but benefits the rich.
I turn now to income responses. I plot the welfare effects with a broken line. Here, income responses are allowed but consumption choices are kept constant. In my model, this means that the agricultural wage income of the household, including corn production and wages from local agricultural markets, react to the increase in the price of corn. This response is characterized by the income shares of agricultural wages and the elasticity of 0.4 reported in Table 2 . Instead, consumption impacts are still measured with budget shares.
In this scenario, an increase in corn prices would benefit households across the entire income distribution. The intuition is that agricultural income and agricultural wages are responding to the price increase.
To account for consumption responses, I estimate first and second order impacts using the corn budget share and the own-price elasticity. 15 In Figure 3 , I graph these welfare 14 The increase in prices may be due to liberalization of corn world markets (as in the Doha development round), or other factors (like domestic agricultural reforms). There are two important issues regarding these price changes: the actual price change induced by the reforms (like Doha) and the pass-through rate to farmers. Even with credible estimates of price increases, segmentation of domestic markets may cushion farmers from international markets. These are important issues, but they are not the topic of the present paper.
15 For simplicity, cross price effects are not computed. Although it is easy to do so given the cross-price effects with a dotted line. It is clear that allowing for consumption responses makes the gains even higher. The reason is that consumers reduce quantities when prices increase so that consumption losses are in the end ameliorated. Notice also that the adjustment of consumption generates larger gains at the bottom of the income distribution. This is because corn is one of the major staples of the poor and the adjustment of quantities thus makes a larger difference for them.
Conclusions
This paper has introduced an empirical model designed to be used in the evaluation of price reforms. These reforms affect households both as consumers and as producers or income earners. Studying consumption effects is relatively straightforward. Budget shares can be used to approximate first order effects. Deaton's methods (Deaton, 1987 (Deaton, , 1988 (Deaton, , and 1990 elasticities that I have estimated, the simpler approach of Figure 3 is, I believe, much clearer.
can be used to estimate demand elasticities and second order effects.
The estimation of labor income effects is harder due to lack of price variability at the household level. The simple idea of using unit values as a proxy for prices, which would deliver enough price variation, is problematic because of endogeneity of unit values, biases due to proxy variables, and measurement error. In this paper, I have proposed a method that uses unit values as measures of prices, but that is free from these problems. The method combines Deaton's model of demand with an equation that describes the agricultural wage income of the household. By estimating the demand model together with the quality shading model, I was able to extract the right price signal from unit value data. These data can then be plugged into the wage equation to identify the relevant elasticities.
When a fraction of household income is allowed to be endogenous, there are additional effects to consider in the estimation of the demand parameters. First, there is the "profit effect"whereby a change in an agricultural price causes a change in household income and additional income effects in consumption. Second, the change in household income brings about further quality shading responses that affect the elasticities of demand. In this paper, I have derived formulas to correct for these factors.
The method was applied to the estimation of consumption and agricultural wage income responses to agricultural prices in rural Mexico. It was found that the corrections suggested in this paper can make a difference and should be preferred to a simpler model that uses average cluster unit values as regressors. Failing to control for endogeneity, biases, and measurement errors may lead to inconsistent estimates of the price elasticities and to an incorrect or misleading evaluation of policy changes. In addition, I have assessed the role of consumption and income responses in the evaluation of trade reforms. I have shown that the proposition that net consumers will be hurt by price increases whereas net producers will be benefited is only true in a static scenario. When consumers adjust quantities, farmers adjust production, and local labor markets react to the changed prices, so that net consumers can become net producers, thus benefiting from price increases. Data from rural Mexico support these findings.
Quality is a function of quantities q cg , reference prices p 0 g , and the quantity aggregator k g . Since p 0 g and k g are held constant, ξ cg is a function of the ratio x cg /π cg . That is,
This implies that
where δ gk is the Kronecker delta.
Differentiating ln x g = ln π g + ln ξ g + ln Q g with respect to ln π g , it follows that
By definition, the expenditure elasticity of quality is
Using once again the equality ln x g = ln π g + ln ξ g + ln Q g , I get
Replacing (A4) and (A5) in (A3), I get
If the same steps are applied to a change in the price of good k, (A2) is
and (A3) is
Now, remember that unit values are the product of price and quality, (ln v g = ln π g + ln ξ g ); differentiating with respect to ln π g and ln π k , and using (A8) and (A9), it follows that (A10)
To end, we need to write the restriction imposed by the assumption of separable preferences in terms of the parameters of the model. Unit value, the ratio of expenditure and reported quantity, is given by v cg = x cg /Q cg . Differentiating with respect to the price of good k, I get
Expenditure on good g is equal to the budget share s g times total expenditure x, or ln x g = ln s g + ln x. This means that
where θ gk is the cross-price elasticity of budget shares and b a λ k captures the change in total expenditure caused by the factor income effects of higher prices (see text). Replacing (A12) and (A13) in (A10), it follows that
Next, differentiating the unit value with respect to total expenditure, I get
It follows that
Equation (27) in the text follows from the combination of (A10), (A11), (A14), and (A15). (1) Naive model with average cluster unit values (standard errors are cluster corrected) (2) Full Model using instrumental variables (3) Full Model using OLS (4) and (5) Alternative 1:Ψ = D(vecdiag( b Ψ)) All models include additional controls, such as demographics, education, age, gender and year dummies. The standard errors (in parenthesis) for the models in columns (2) to (5) are computed by bootstrapping the second stage. (1) and (2) Expenditure elasticity of budget shares (β 0 ) for Deaton and Full Model (3) and (4) Quality Elasticity (β 1 ) for Deaton and Full Model (5) and (6) Expenditure elasticity of demand ( x ) for Deaton and Full Model (7) Average budget Share in the sample Standard errors in parenthesis 
